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I. INTRODUCTION
In one of the more famous dicta in the Alcoa decision, Judge
Learned Hand asserted that, "The successful competitor, having
been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins. "I
There is a good deal of irony in this. Hand found Alcoa to have
monopolized, and thus to have violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, even though its conduct would have been lawful had it been
less sucessful. In the US and the EEC, firms that have been
successful enough to have attained near-monopoly or dominant
market positions are subject to rules of conduct stricter than
those applied to other firms. 2 Highly "sucessful" firms are thus
always "turned upon" to some extent. As one law professor turned
executive puts it, enforcement of the US antitrust laws generally
involves "beating up the winners."3
In this essay I explore the contributions industrial
economics and industrial economists can make to debates about
general rules of conduct or case-specific remedies proposed for
application to firms that have attained "dominance." I limit
my attention to considerations of economic efficiency, though
antitrust policy may of course be employed to pursue other
objectives as well. (Here and in all that follows I use "anti-
trust" as shorthand for "what is called 'antitrust' in the
U.S. and 'competition law' elsewhere". This shorthand correctly
signals my much greater familiarity with antitrust policy in
the U.S. than elsewhere.)
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I begin in Section II by defining market dominance in the
antitrust context and discusssing the persistence of dominant
positions over time. Section III considers theory and
historical evidence on the origins of dominant positions.
Relying on this background, Section IV argues that the
efficiency consequences of "beating up the winners", by imposing
rules designed to limit the returns to dominance or to hasten its
erosion, are generally unknowable. (Rules aimed at preventing
the acquisition of dominant positions are not explicitly
considered, though most of the arguments and conclusions advanced
here also apply to such rules.) Several fundamental second-best
problems are unavoidable when competition is imperfect, and, as
usual, second-best problems give rise to policy prescriptions too
complex to be followed with any precision. As I have discussed
elsewhere (Schmalensee [1982]), difficulties of this sort that
are inherent in many areas of antitrust have been made visible
by recent theoretical work in industrial economics.
Section V considers in general terms what economists can
contribute to the task of devising efficiency-enhancing rules for
dominant firm conduct in light of these difficulties. While
humility is called for, complete agnosticism is not. The
academic debate in the U.S. on rules governing predatory pricing
and related practices is employed as an illustrative example.
Finally, Section VI provides a brief summary of the essay's
main points and their implications for policy debates in anti-
trust.
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II. ARET_ OMINNCANDT PEISTENCE
The meanings attached to "dominant firm" and "monopoly" in
antitrust are broader than the definitions of those terms in
economic theory. A "dominant firm" in economic theory is
generally a single large seller facing many, small, price-taking
rivals, while a "monopoly" is the only seller of some good or
service. In antitrust, both terms are generally used to refer
to a seller that is able to exercise substantial market power
(or, equivalently, monopoly power) unilaterally, without the
need for collusive arrangements. This definition of dominance
or monopoly, which I adopt here, includes markets approximating
(to an unspecified degree of exactness) the limiting cases of
theory. Firms that pass this test are usually appreciably
larger than their closest rivals, since tacit or overt collusion
is typically required for the exercise of appreciable market
power in oligopolistic markets.
As Landes and Posner [1981] argue, economic theory indicates
that one ought to define a firm with substantial market power as
one that is able to enhance its profits by raising prices
substantially above marginal costs for a substantial volume of
sales. The deadweight loss produced by the exercise of monopoly
power provides a natural measure of substantiality reflecting
both of these considerations (Schmalensee [1982]). Most firms
in developed economies have some market power; only a few have
enough to be characterized as "dominant" or "monopolies". There
is essentially no basis in economics for the existence of a
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sharp dividing line between "dominant" firms and others, however,
since market power is naturally measured along a continuum.
Market power is often associated with market share, and
judgements about the presence or absence of market power often
turn on the definition of the "relevant market," especially in
U.S. antitrust cases. For purposes of assessing market power,
it is logical to follow Areeda and Turner [1978, p. 347] and
define a "relevant market" for antitrust purposes as "a firm or
group of firms which, if unified by agreement or merger, would
have market power." In other words, a market is an aggregation
(over space and/or products) of outputs that could profitably
be monopolized, at least in the short run. (The smallest such
aggregate should generally be the focus of analysis.) This
definition is also generally consistent with the discussions of
market definition in Landes and Posner [1981] and the
U.S. Justice Department [1984] Merger Guidelines. Dominant
firms commonly have large shares of sales in one or more relevant
markets thus defined. But the correspondence between market
share and market power is far from exact, and market share is
not necessarily the best indicator of power.4
In the Cellophane case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a monopoly is a firm with
"the power to control prices or exclude competition. "5 This
blurs the important distinction between short-run and long-run
market power. A seller with a very large share of market
capacity or output is likely have considerable short-run market
power, since it should be able profitably "to control prices"
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to an appreciable extent in the short run. Exceptions may
arise when the largest firm has higher costs than its rivals or
can only produce inferior products. But long-run market power,
"the power to control price" in the face of the investment
decisions of actual and potential rivals, requires the ability
to restrict or "exclude competition". And, as the work of
Worchester [1957], Gaskins [1971], and others shows, "the power
to exclude competition" in the long run can only derive from
long-run (i.e., long-lived) advantages over actual or potential
rivals. This literature makes it clear that size does not by
itself confer such advantages. As Stigler's [1964] discussion
of the difficulty of detecting price cuts by small firms
indicates, size can even be a strategic handicap; see also
Gelman and Salop [1983].
Salop [1979] has pointed out that there are two types of
long-run advantages that may enable an established dominant firm
to preserve its market position despite assaults by "entrants",
who may be newcomers to the industry or agressive fringe firms.
(I depart from Salop's terminology in what follows.) Operating
advantages correspond to Bain's [1956] absolute cost and product
differentiation barriers to entry. A firm with operating advan-
tages has lower costs or more favorable demand conditions
(perhaps because of superior products) than any potential
entrant. Patents and trade secrets are the most obvious poten-
tial sources of such asymmetries. If a dominant firm has
operating advantages, it is simply not feasible for an entrant
to match its cost/demand position. The entrant would thus be
5
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at a disadvantage relative to the incumbent in post-entry
operations.
On the other hand, strategic advantages may arise in this
context simply because the dominant firm appears on the market
first and can acquire assets before potential entrants make their
decisions. (These are called first-mover advantages in the
language of game theory.) In Bain's [1956] analysis, scale
economies can provide an incumbent firm with a strategic advan-
tage: even if products are homogeneous and all firms' costs are
given by the same function, if an entrant adds appreciably to
industry capacity (so as to avoid being at a cost disadvantage),
price may be sufficiently depressed as to render entry
unattractive even though incumbents earn substantial excess
profits. Strategic advantages arise when an entrant can acquire
the same tangible (plant, equipment) and intangible (technology,
reputation) assets as an established firm but can only do so on
less favorable terms. Unlike operating advantages, strategic
advantages are not eroded by the expiration of patents or the
diffusion of knowledge among potential entrants. But if sucess-
ful entry does occur, strategic advantages do not help the
incumbent firm in post-entry competition.
As Geroski and Jacquemin [1984] have emphasized in their
valuable overview of the relevant theoretical literature,
dominant firms may obtain strategic advantages from many
sources.6 Generally these involve the ability of established
firms to make irreversible, long-lived investments in tangible
or intangible assets before entrants appear. That is, sunk
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costs (Baumol and Willig [1981]) must be present and important.
By incurring sunk costs in a strategic manner, an incumbent may
be able to make a commitment that makes credible a threat to
respond harshly to entry. (A threat is credible if and only if
it would be in the interest of the threatener to carry it out;
non-credible threats are bluffs. See Dixit [1982] for a nice
exposition of these and related concepts.) Spence [1981a]
terms such investments pre-entry positioning moves, as opposed
to post-entry reactions to new entry. As Spence emphasizes,
both sorts of actions generally involve a waste of resources,
as do entrants' attempts to respond. (On this latter point,
especially, see Hillman [1984].)
A second common theme in the literature on strategic advan-
tages is the existence of scale economies of one sort or another,
following Bain [1956]. Scale economies make it uneconomic for
an entrant to appear at such a small scale that no substantial
competitive response to its entry would be rational. If such
entry is possible, pre-entry market conditions fully describe the
post-entry environment.
Spence's [1977] seminal rehabilitation of the concept of
entry deterrence furnishes the standard example of strategic
advantage and of pre-entry positioning by an established firm.
In this paper and the large literature to which it has given
rise, an incumbent monopolist faced with the threat of entry
rationally makes larger irreversible investments in production
capacity than it otherwise would. These socially inefficient
investments make vigorous reaction to entry more attractive to
7
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the incumbent by lowering its marginal costs for high levels of
output. This in turns makes entry less attractive, especially
in the presence of scale economies. (Interesting recent
contributions to this literature include Bulow, et al [1985a]
and Eaton and Lipsey [1981].) In order for this mechanism to
be an important source of persistent dominant firm profits,
however, scale economies must be unusually important by
U.S. standards (Schmalensee [1981b]).
Pre-entry investment in long-lived capacity is not the only
potential source of strategic advantage for dominant firms. In
markets in which buyers incur direct or opportunity (Schmalensee
[1982c]) costs of switching to new brands, the first firm to make
substantial sales acquires a strategic advantage over later
entrants, which may serve to deter entry in the presence of scale
economies. No inefficient, positioning investment is required
to obtain this advantage, though its optimal exploitation may
involve sacrificing profits in order to penetrate the market
more rapidly than would be optimal if there were no threat of
subsequent entry.
In some situations, established dominant firms can ration-
ally make preemptive investments that eliminate avenues along
which entry might occur. Such investments may involve new
products that crowd geographic (Eaton and Lipsey [1979]) or
product (Schmalensee [1978]) space. Alternatively, as Gilbert
and Newbery [1982] have shown, an incumbent may be able profit-
ably to preempt potential new technologies by accelerating its
own research and development efforts, even in the absence of
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scale economies. It is easy to over-state the importance of
preemptive strategies, however. Preemptive investment in R&D,
in particular, is possible only under fairly restrictive condi-
tions on the invention/innovation process and the set of poten-
tial new technologies.7
Advertising may have long-lived effects on buyer behavior,
and pre-entry investment in advertising may be a source of strat-
egic advantage. But the competitive effects of such investments
depend critically on the way advertising affects buyers; adver-
tising may tilt competition in favor of later entrants under some
conditions (Schmalensee [1983]). See Fudenberg and Tirole [1984]
and Bulow, et al [1985b] for general discussions of the issues
involved.
An incumbent dominant firm's strategic advantages may be
rationally exploited by aggressive reactions to entry. It may
be rational to engage in predation to prevent outsiders from
matching the established firm's knowledge of cost and demand
conditions (Scharfstein [1984]). It may also be rational to
engage in predation to build a reputation for toughness that
will discourage other potential entrants (Kreps and Wilson
[1982], Milgrom and Roberts [1982]) or facilitate merger on
favorable terms (Saloner [1985]). Similarly, a rational incum-
bent may attempt to eliminate rivals before they have been able
to demonstrate their competence to suppliers of capital (Benoit
[1984], Fudenberg and Tirole [1985]). Advertising may rationally
be used as a predatory weapon under some conditions (Hilke and
Nelson [1984]). And the work of Salop and Scheffman [1983]
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suggests that established firms may be able credibly to threaten
a variety of wasteful, cost-increasing reactions to entry (such
as litigation) without making any pre-entry positioning moves.
Finally, the presence of firm-specific (i.e., proprietary)
learning economies can create both strategic and operating advan-
tages. (See Spence [1981b] and Fudenberg and Tirole [1983] for
theoretical analyses and Lieberman [1984] for interesting
evidence on the importance of proprietary learning economies.)
An established firm may be able to lower its costs well below
those of potential entrants by increasing output before the
threat of entry appears. Once it has done this, it has acquired
operating advantages. Because later entrants face competition
that the first mover did not, they cannot expect to be able to
invest in lower costs by increasing output on the same terms
that the established dominant firm faced.
Unfortunately, the theoretical prediction that dominant
positions not protected by strategic or operating advantages will
tend to decay tells us nothing about the speed with which such
positions decay in real markets. This is an empirical question.
Similarly, even though a large number of strategic and operating
advantages can in theory prevent entry indefinitely, one cannot
conclude that real dominant positions never decay. In a world
in which tastes and technologies change and managements protected
from competition tend to go soft, one expects dominant firms'
advantages to retard the growth of competition, not to exclude
it completely and forever. Moreover, as Caves, et al [19841
emphasize, a dominant firm with weak advantages over actual and
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potential competitors may choose to accept the inevitability of
its own decline and concentrate on maximizing short-run profits,
rather than spending money to deter potential new entrants or to
discourage aggressive rivals. A second empirical question is
then the importance of the strategic and operating advantages
discussed in the theoretical literature in preventing or retard-
ing the decay of dominance in real industries.
Most studies of the evolution of dominant positions do not
focus clearly on either of these questions. Weiss and Pascoe
[1984] have argued that dominance has tended to persist in recent
years, for instance, and Mueller [1977] has argued that inter-
firm profitability differences also persist over long periods,
but neither paper tells us why. (See also Geroski [1986] and the
reference he cites on the persistence of large market shares.)
Study of the evolution of firms with large market shares created
by mergers in the U.S. between 1882 (Standard Oil) and 1903 (the
Northern Securities decision) seems a very promising source of
answers. A contemporary observer identified 78 large mergers in
this period resulting in firms controlling at least half the
output of their industries.8
For instance, if one assumes that U.S. Steel had no long-run
advantages over its rivals (see note 10, below, and Chandler
[1977, p. 361]), the decline in its market share from 66% in 1901
to 42% in 1925 (Stigler [1965]) may be taken as suggestive of a
half-life of purely short-run dominance of about 37 years.9 This
seems very slow decay indeed, and Geroski's [1986] analysis
suggests that it is not unusual. But, as Caves, et al [1984]
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note, a sizeable number of apparently dominant firms formed in
the same merger movement failed within a few years of their
creation; see Chandler [1977, ch. 10] for discussion of some
examples. Caves and his associates study 34 large mergers that
survived until 1929 and present evidence that firms with weak
advantages suffered more rapid declines in market share than
others but enjoyed higher profits. They attribute this pattern
to rational decisions to harvest weakly-protected dominant posi-
tions even if entry was thereby accelerated.
Overall, the pattern that emerges is mixed. Some firms that
apparently began with dominant positions vanished quickly: the
National Cordage Association failed three years after its
formation (Chandler [1977, pp. 329-330]). But some firms
created around the turn of the century remained dominant for a
half-century or more: consider Eastman Kodak and United Shoe
Machinery. Market dominance is not inevitably long-lived, but
if it is protected by substantial and continuing operating or
strategic advantages, it may persist for many decades.
III ·_SURCESS O MAREKT-DQ INANCE
Restrictions on the conduct of dominant firms limit the
returns to the activity of creating market dominance. The
literature contains two competing characterizations of this
activity. The first follows Posner [1975] and emphasizes
rent-seeking, while the second follows Schumpeter [1942] and
stresses innovation.
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Posner [1975] argued that there are no barriers to entry to
the business of creating monopolies, so that the average returns
to this activity should be competitive. (One might think about
the business of increasing concentration through horizontal
mergers in this context.) If, as he contended, this activity is
not itself directly productive, one would expect that on average
the present value of the profits of new monopolies should equal
the costs expended in competing for their ownership. That is,
the rents produced by monopoly should be fully dissipated in the
activity of monopoly creation. If this is correct, the social
costs of monopoly may be very large indeed; see Cowling and
Mueller [1978] for some estimates for the U.S. and the U.K.
There are two basic problems with this view, however.
First, the assumption of full dissipation is likely to be too
strong. Rents will not be fully dissipated if risks and risk-
aversion are important (Hillman and Katz [1984]) or if competi-
tion for monopoly ownership is imperfect (Tullock [1980]). The
latter point seems particularly relevant. While everybody
would like to own a dominant firm, historically it is hard to
find evidence of vigorous competition for many dominant posi-
tions. The number of people in a position to contemplate
consolidation of the U.S. steel industry in 1901 could not have
been large; the number who both recognized the potential gains
and expended resources to secure them must have been much
smaller. In fact, no evidence of any competition for this




A second problem with the rent-seeking/rent-dissipation view
is raised by Demsetz [1976]. Posner's [1975] paper and the
literature to which it has given rise concentrate on attempts to
use the government to create dominant positions. Here one can
find evidence of competition through lobbying and other means,
though that competition may often be imperfect. (It is
presumably no accident that Lyndon Johnson's relatives were
granted lucrative rights to operate several television stations
in Texas while he was majority leader of the U.S. Senate.) But
most dominant positions are not critically dependent on legisla-
tion or administrative decisions. In those cases, Demsetz
asks, in what socially unproductive, rent-seeking activities
can would-be monopolists invest? At the very least, the litera-
ture contains no documented examples of substantial investments
of this sort unconnected with attempts to influence government
decisions. This goes mainly to the question of rent dissipation,
of course; horizontal mergers for monopoly may be directly
unproductive but require small (net) investments and thus be
highly profitable.
Demsetz [1976] gives a Schumpeterian answer to his own
question. He contends that would-be monopolists invest in
building better mousetraps and that actual monopolists are
those who succeed. And one can certainly find examples of
apparently dominant firms whose initial market positions derived
in large measure from innovation: Alcoa, Gilette, Eastman
Kodak, and Xerox come quickly to mind. But this purely
Schumpeterian view is incomplete as an empirical matter, and it
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has no rigorously defensible welfare implications. The promoters
of the U.S. Steel merger were surely not engaged in innovative
activity in any usual sense of that term. And, while IBM's
rise to dominance in the business segment of the mainframe
computer market did require innovation, it was certainly facili-
tated by that firm's prior market position in punched card
tabulating machines and by its rivals' early mistakes. Finally,
on the normative front, a large literature has now made it
clear that Schumpeterian competition can lead to technical
progress that is sometimes faster and sometimes slower than the
optimum.
Chandler's [1977] study of the origins of large U.S. firms
in the years before World War I suggests that on balance innova-
tion, broadly defined, played an important part in the creation
of persistent dominant positions in the U.S.. His thesis is
basically that innovations in transportation and communications
in the nineteenth century created potential economies of scale
in some industries and made new forms of production and distribu-
tion attractive in others. Some large firms arose because
innovative entrepreneurs saw these opportunities and sought to
take advantage of them; the large railroads, Swift & Co.,
Montgomery Ward, and Sears provide clear examples. Others
large enterprises were created by mergers because existing
cartels were perceived as suboptimal or, after 1897, illegal.
Examples here include Standard Oil, National Cordage, and
National Lead. Chandler discusses many intermediate cases that
15
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involved both response to new opportunities and avoidance of
competition.
Chandler [1977, pp. 337-344] goes on to argue that success-
ful consolidations (as measured by profitability) generally
had two common features. First, they took place "in the high-
volume, large-batch, or continuous process industries and in
those needing specialized marketing services [p. 338]," that
is, in the industries in which technical change had created new
opportunities. Second, he contends that "mergers were rarely
successful until managerial hierarchies were created -- that
is, until production was consolidated and until the firm had
it- own marketing and purchasing organizations [p. 338]." 10 A
central argument of Chandler's book is that the creation of
managerial hierarchies was generally an act of innovation in
this period, and it was certainly directly productive. Large
firms created in industries where there were no scale economies
tended to perform badly, especially if managerial hierarchies
were not created to impose effective central direction. On the
other hand, scale economies were sometimes exploited to produce
strategic advantages that protected dominant positions for
decades.
Though Chandler's main focus is on the U.S., his central
arguments have to do with the consequences of technical change,
not with U.S. institutions. Thus his work is at least suggestive
about the creation and evolution of market dominance outside the
U.S.. On the other hand, for various reasons, horizontal mergers
seem to have played a greater role in the creation and mainten-
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ance of dominant positions in other countries; see, for instance,
Hannah and Kay [1977]. This may well reflect-more rent-seeking
activity.
The discussion here and in Section II leads to the following
view of the positive economics of market dominance, which I adopt
in what follows. Firms may achieve short-run dominance through
merger or other actions that are not directly productive. But
most dominant positions, particularly those created in the
U.S. after "merger for monopoly" was ruled illegal in 1903, have
their origins to an important extent in innovation, broadly
defined. Firms that attain short-run dominance by merger or
other means but have no advantages over actual and potential
rivals and are badly managed tend to perform poorly and lose
dominance in a matter of years. In other cases, dominant
positions may take many decades to decay appreciably, especially
if strategic or operating advantages can be exploited by pre-
entry positioning moves or post-entry reactions. In the presence
of such advantages, the rate of decay of its market position is
to some extent under a dominant firm's control; it can sacrifice
current profits to slow the erosion of its market share.
IV. RESTRICTIONS_Q_QND UCT AND_ ECQNDBEST POBLEMS
In light of the foregoing, I now outline some basic problems
encountered by attempts to devise efficiency-enhancing restric-
tions on the conduct of dominant firms. The fundamental point
here is that in imperfectly competitive markets, one must
17
III
generally solve second-best problems in order to derive
efficiency-enhancing rules or remedies.
Classically, second-best problems arise because the impact
of changes in one market is affected by distortions in other
markets. Thus if the price of oil is above (social) marginal
cost, the optimal price of coal is given by a complex formula
that is unlikely to describe the result of unregulated competi-
tion. Antitrust analysts typically duck problems of this sort
(see, for instance, Scherer [1980, pp. 28-29]), and I will follow
suit. But recent theoretical work in industrial economics has
made clear the existence of serious single-market second-best
problems that are harder to duck. That is, if one or more of the
necessary conditions for perfect competition is violated in the
coal market, it may not be optimal to move toward satisfaction
of any of the other necessary conditions in that market. In this
Section, I outline some of the single-market second-best problems
that arise in connection with the antitrust treatment of market
dominance.
Let us initially ignore the long-run effects of antitrust
policy on activities aimed at the creation of dominance. I term
the effects that remain short-run for simplicity, though it
should be clear from the discussion above that the short run can
be very long indeed by usual standards.
Consider first rules aimed at limiting the exploitation of
a dominant firm's market power. The clearest case for short-run
efficiency gains is provided by the doctrine under Article 86 of
the Treaty of Rome that high prices can constitute abuse of a
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dominant position. (See Fox [1984] for a discussion of (and an
American reaction to) the relevant EC Court of Justice cases.)
The implicit rule or restriction is that a dominant firm's prices
cannot be "too high". Putting aside the costs of comprehensive
price regulation by non-specialists of firms in many different
sectors and ignoring possible multiple-market second-best
problems, the short-run efficiency properties of this rule are
clear. Society as a whole gains if monopoly prices are reduced,
as long as they are not reduced below marginal cost.
Other rules with this same aim have less predictable effects
on economic efficiency, however. Limits on price discrimination
may reduce the returns to dominance, but the welfare effects of
prohibiting classic third-degree price discrimination or tying
arrangements used to implement second-degree discrimination (via
two-part tariffs) are ambiguous. (See Varian [1985] and
Schmalensee [1981b], respectively.) Similarly, limitations on
the ability of firms with market power to impose restrictions on
their customers may enhance or reduce economic efficiency in
theory, and economists have recently come to believe that reduc-
tions are more likely. (It should be noted that one cannot
easily explain this shift of opinion by pointing to new
evidence.) Overstreet's [1983] careful analysis of vertical
price-fixing, wherein a manufacturer sets retail prices, reveals
the multitude of conflicting theories and bits of evidence that




Rules designed to hasten the erosion of dominant positions
by facilitating new entry or the expansion of fringe firms have
been shown to have similarly ambiguous consequences for economic
efficiency. As von Weizsacker [1980a, 1980b] has argued,
barriers to entry that (following Bain's [1956] definition)
permit established firms to earn supra-competitive profits are
not necessarily inefficient when all the conditions necessary
for classical perfect competition are not present. A reduction
in entry barriers may result in a loss of efficiency.
This is easiest to demonstrate when the persistence of
dominance rests in part on operating advantages. Elimination of
such advantages in order to facilitate entry may replace low-cost
monopoly by high-cost competition. Following Williamson's [1968]
pioneering treatment of this problem, suppose a market with a
linear demand curve is served by a monopolist with constant
unit cost C that charges a price P. Suppose that antitrust can
eliminate the dominant firm's advantage and produce a competitive
market with price and unit cost equal to C' > C. Then a bit of
algebra shows that net welfare (consumers' surplus plus
producers' profits) increases if and only if
(1) C' < [2-(3)1/ 2 ]P + [(3)1/2 -1]C = [.268]P + [.732]C
= P[ - (.732)L],
where L is the Lerner measure of the (original) degree of
monopoly, equal to (P-C)/P.
As Williamson stressed, a price reduction (C' < P) is
necessary but not sufficient for a welfare gain. The stronger
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the original monopoly position, as measured by L, the greater the
price reduction required to offset the elimination of operating
advantages. Equation (1) is a simple formula, but it is hard to
imagine antitrust authorities having sufficient information to
implement it in particular cases without a substantial chance of
error. It is even harder to see how (1) could be used as the
basis for a general rule to be applied to all dominant firms.
Even if a dominant firm's operating advantages are
untouched, antitrust policy that facilitates entry may reduce
efficiency. Suppose that a dominant firm's position is as
above and that there is a single potential entrant with constant
unit cost C', with C < C' < P. If the second firm enters and
post-entry behavior is Cournot, competition is increased and
price is reduced. But, following Schmalensee [1976], efficiency
is enhanced under these assumptions if and only if
(2) C' < [5/11]? + [6/11]C = [.455]?P + [.545]C
= P[1 - (.545)L].
This imposes a less stringent test than (1). Higher values of
C' are consistent with increased efficiency even though the
post-entry price exceeds C' in Cournot equilibrium.
Somewhat surprisingly, a test of intermediate stringency
emerges when the queue of potential entrants is long. That is,
suppose that N firms enter with cost C' under the assumptions
above. Then as N increases without bound, price falls to C' and
the condition for welfare improvement is
21
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(3) C' < [1/3]P + [2/3]C = [.333]P + [.667]C
E[1 - (.667)L].
This is less stringent than (1) because the low-cost firm is
still producing; it is more stringent than (2) because the
low-cost firm has a smaller market share in the limiting equilib-
rium.
Conditions (2) and (3) would be even more difficult than (1)
to apply in particular cases or in the design of general rules,
since the number and costs of potential entrants are likely to
be very difficult to estimate accurately. Conditions (2) and (3)
make clear that privately profitable high-cost entry may be
socially inefficient when competition is imperfect. Policies
that encourage such entry may therfore reduce economic
efficiency, even though they hasten the erosion of dominant
positions.
Economies of scale or learning rule out market equilibria
or efficient outcomes with many sellers and thus force analysis
into the realm of the second-best. A number of authors,
including von Weizsacker [1980a, 1980b], Perry [1984], and
Mankiw and Whinston [1985], have shown that if established
firms lack operating advantages and take no actions to exploit
strategic advantages to deter entry, too much entry generally
occurs when scale economies are present. This occurs because
potential entrants do not take into account the fact that their
entry would raise the costs and lower the profits of existing
firms. That is, even though economies of scale give rise to
Bainian entry barriers, entry is likely to be excessive from
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the viewpoint of economic efficiency, not deficient. Antitrust
policy that prevents the exploitation of strategic advantages
or otherwise facilitates entry may reduce efficiency under
these conditions, even though it enhances competition and
reduces wasteful investment in pre-entry positioning. And
von Weizsacker [1980a] has argued that Bainian entry barriers may
contribute to social efficiency in other settings as well.
Still restricting attention to the short-run effects effects
of rules designed to facilitate entry in order to erode dominant
positions, two additional problems deserve mention. First,
Spence [1981a] has noted that restrictions on permissible
reactions to entry, which are the most frequently discussed
anti-monopoly rules in the U.S., may not in fact prevent dominant
firms from deterring entry. Such restrictions may instead
cause dominant firms to increase the resources they devote to
pre-entry positioning moves. Such investments are generally
wasteful, as are potential entrants' attempts to offset them
(Hillman [1984]). But, as Spence [1981a, p. 60] points out,
there are no known, unambiguously beneficial simple rules
that can be applied to investments prior to entry..." That is,
positioning is even harder to regulate efficiently than reac-
tions. Second, Bernhein [1984] has shown that when potential
entrants appear sequentially over time, policies that make
entry deterrrence more difficult may have the perverse effect
of discouraging entry on balance. If tomorrow's entry cannot
be deterred, today's entry may not occur.
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I have argued so far that, aside from regulation that forces
monopoly prices closer to marginal costs, it is hard to find
rules designed to limit the ability of dominant firms to exploit
their market positions that are unambiguously
efficiency-enhancing in the short run. And it may be even more
difficult to design rules that will both hasten the erosion of
dominant positions and improve economic welfare in the short
run. The use of strategic and (especially) operating advantages
to deter entry is not necessarily socially undesirable. When
we consider the long-run effects of restrictions on dominant
firm conduct, a new set of difficulties appear, and even the
efficiency properties of price ceilings are seen to be unclear
in principle.
Rules that limit the short-run returns to dominant positions
or hasten their erosion reduce the attractiveness of investments
aimed at producing market dominance. If all such investments
represented directly unproductive rent-seeking, such rules would
be efficiency-enhancing on this score.
But, as I argued in Section III, life is not so
simple. Many dominant positions are at least in part attribut-
able to innovative activity, broadly defined. Policies that
reduce the present value of market dominance thus reduce the
returns to innovation. Despite the importance of innovation in
advancing economic welfare, however, it does not follow that
all restrictions on dominant firms have undesirable long-run
effects. Reductions in patent lifetimes also reduce the returns
to innovation, but it does not follow that the optimal patent
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lifetime is infinite. And, despite Schumpeter's [1942]
eloquence, there is no good reason to think that unrestricted
market competition produces the optimal rate and direction of
technical progress.
The patent analogy is both instructive and depressing.
Attempts to deduce the optimal patent lifetime serve mainly to
make clear the intractible nature of this problem. (See Nordhaus
[1969] for the most important attempt at its solution; Scherer
[1977, pp. 25-34] surveys the literature.) Again we are in the
realm of the second-best; longer patent lifetimes encourage
innovation but prolong monopoly. A host of clearly arbitrary,
special assumptions are required to produce a quantitative
"solution". The analogous problem of the optimal degree of
severity of restrictions on dominant firms is even less tract-
able, for two reasons. First, while innovative activity may be
an important source of dominant positions, it is plainly not
the only source. To an unknown extent, restrictions on dominant
firms also lower the returns to directly unproductive rent-
seeking. Second, there is no single variable in the dominant
firm context that corresponds directly to patent lifetime.
Antitrust policy is multi-dimensional and cannot reliably
dictate the lifetimes of dominant firms.
When the long-run effects of restrictions on dominant firms
are considered, then, the ambiguity revealed by short-run
analysis deepens. In particular, restrictions on the level of
prices charged by dominant firms are no longer clearly
efficiency-enhancing. Even if patents are not involved, such
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restrictions are likely to reduce the returns to innovation,
broadly defined.
I must admit that this long-run analysis strikes even its
author as somewhat academic in the context of current antitrust
policies in the U.S. and Western Europe. The gains to entrepre-
neurs and/or shareholders from creating an enterprise like Xerox
or IBM are currently so enormous that it is hard to believe that
even a sizeable percentage reduction in those rewards would
have much effect on innovative activity. But this is purely an
opinion; I know of no hard evidence that could be used to make
it into a rigorous argument.
V._POTENTIALCONTRIBUTIONS_QF_ECQNOMICS_AND_EQQNOMISTS
The preceding analysis is depressing stuff for an economist
interested in antitrust policy. The arguments of Section IV
imply that such an economist can never hope to prove that any
proposed general rule restricting dominant firm conduct would
increase or decrease efficiency in all cases. Further, contemp-
lation of the unusually simple rules presented in Section IV in
light of the state of empirical knowledge in industrial economics
suggests that it will rarely be possible to support rigorously
an assertion that any proposed general rule will enhance
efficiency in most cases or that the costs of adopting (or not
adopting) it will outweigh the benefits. Moreover, second-best
problems make it nearly impossible to analyze rigorously and
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completely the efficiency consequences of many sorts of case-
specific rules, even if long-run effects are ignored.
Recognition of these problems should make us bit more humble
than many economists have been or seemed to be in the past. But
I do not think that we need to be absolutely silent in debates
about general rules or particular cases. In this Section I
present three principles that economists can use to make positive
contributions in debates on antitrust policies toward dominant
firms and illustrate my general remarks with a brief discussion
of the U.S. debate on predatory practices. (For a broadly
similar sermon, addressed by a U.S. law professor (now judge)
to his peers, see Easterbrook [1984].)
First, rules designed to "beat up the winners" should only
be applied to genuine winners. That is to say, rules that have
as their main raison d'etre their ability to reduce the value of
dominant positions or to hasten their demise should only be
applied to dominant firms, sellers with unusually important
monopoly power. This simple observation has implications for
both rule-making and the analysis of particular cases.
In the U.S., for instance, rules against tying contracts and
price discrimination apply, in principle at least, to firms with
small amounts of market power (Landes and Posner [1981]). Since
the efficiency properties of these restrictions on conduct are
unclear if market structure is taken as given, it is not apparent
why they should be imposed upon non-dominant sellers without much
monopoly power. If a firm has little monopoly power, the
potential gains from limiting the returns to that power or
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hastenings its erosion are correspondingly small. On the other
hand, the efficiency case against applying these rules to
dominant firms is less clear, since they may serve to alter
market structures in a pro-competitive direction. But if such
a tax on dominance is imposed, it should clearly be accompanied
by an economically valid test for dominance. Economists have a
good deal to say about such tests (see Section II, above) and
about their application to particular cases. The same progress
in industrial economics that has weakened our confidence in
normative prescriptions has strengthened our ability to diagnose
market power.
Second, I think that the efficiency effects of proposed
general rules or case-specific remedies should be debated, even
if economists cannot analyze them completely and rigorously. Two
plausible presumptions can serve to structure such debates.
On the one hand, in light of the many virtues of the market
mechanism, general rules or case-specific remedies that would
alter the outcome of market processes ought not to be adopted
unless supported by a plausible argument that short-run
efficiency, in the sense of Section IV, is likely to be enhanced,
even if the overall, long-run, net effect must remain unknow-
able. This presumption, for instance, suggests that the burden
of proof should be borne by those who would prevent dominant
firms from engaging in business practices that are not uncommon
among non-dominant firms; their use by such firms would seem to
create a rebuttable presumption that they contribute to
efficiency.
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On the other hand, a generally pro-competitive antitrust
policy seems more likely to enhance efficiency than a policy
aimed at any alternative well-defined objective, and government
intervention without well-defined objectives is likely mainly to
produce mischief. I would accordingly contend that there should
also be a rebuttable presumption that increasing the effective-
ness of competition is likely to increase economic efficiency,
as long as promoting competition is clearly distinguished from
protecting competitors.1l It follows from this, for instance,
that the argument that purely punative measures taken against
dominant firms might in theory increase welfare by reducing
rent-seeking should not serve to rationalize the imposition of
such measures.
I think the preceeding two paragraphs give a fair descrip-
tion of the approach most economists (in the U.S., at least) in
fact apply to antitrust issues. The only real novelty here is
the explicit recognition that this approach is not at all the
same thing as rigorous analysis of economic efficiency. A
responsible expert in the public arena should not claim too
much for his expertise. And we must recognize that the state
of our knowledge is such that competent economists will continue
to disagree as to the plausibilty of efficiency arguments and
the likelihood of enhanced competition, both in general and in
particular cases. Moreover, the two presumptions advanced
above are not fully consistent: they treat differently business
practices that are likely to contribute both to the efficiency
of a dominant firm's operations and to the preservation of its
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market position. Competent economists will also continue to
disagree about the relative values of operating efficiency and
enhanced competition in such contexts.
This second principle is a weak in a number of senses. But
it can be quite powerful in some situations. It requires that
arguments about efficiency and competitive effects be presented
and critically evaluated before intervention in market processes
is supported. And it is not hard to find examples of antitrust
rules or decisions for which no remotely plausible efficiency or
competitive arguments exist: the differential treatment of price
and non-price vertical restrictions in U.S. antitrust law comes
immediately to mind.
Third, economists should take seriously the social value of
predictable rules of law. The less predictable are antitrust
decisions, the more risk is borne by society as a whole, and
risk-bearing and risk-shedding actions are socially expensive.
If industrial economics generally permitted clear efficiency
conclusions to be drawn from rule-of-reason analysis of
particular cases, the value of predictability might be over-
shadowed by the errors that would result from the application
of simple, bright-line standards. But in many situations
involving dominant firms, the most careful, long, and expensive
studies imaginable of the efficiency consequences of particular
rules will not produce definitive answers. One knows in advance
that competent economists will continue to disagree even after
a long and well-run trial and/or the publication of a barrage
of articles in the journals.
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The alternative is to limit the scope of antitrust
proceedings to issues that can be reliably decided and to
employ simple general rules as extensively as possible. Rules
in the US against price-fixing and horizontal mergers for
monopoly permit short proceedings and probably (but not demon-
strably) enhance efficiency. To replace them by rule-of-reason
standards would make antitrust litigation more expensive and
antitrust decisions less predictable, and it is hard to believe
economic efficiency would be on balance enhanced. Economists
can speak confidently (if not unanimously) on issues of monopoly
power and effects on competition; these can be part of relatively
simple rules for deciding antitrust cases. But this leaves us
well short of classic, unstructured rule-of-reason proceedings.
Indeed, a currenly popular prescription with which I generally
agree is to move toward "structured rules of reason"; short
algorithms for making decisions about specific allegations.
(See the discussion of predatory pricing below.)
As in macroeconomics, we should take seriously the implica-
tions of our inability to engage in useful "fine-tuning" of
economic processes. In contrast to macroeconomics, however,
there is no new body of theory suggesting that it is impossible
in principle to improve on unregulated imperfectly-competitive
markets. That is, the argument for predictability and simplicity
is not an argument for laissez-faire. It simply implies that
attempting to attain unattainable precision is likely to be
expensive, both directly and indirectly, and antitrust
authorities should, like Ulysses, tie themselves to the mast to
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avoid temptation. It is important to note that the result of
such an approach may be either softer or tougher than the
status quo; it all depends on the sort of rules and procedures
that are adopted.
When competent economists disagree on the best simple anti-
trust rule in a particular context, society may in many circum-
stances risk little by using predictability and administrative
simplicity to settle the argument. But if antitrust is to be a
coherent policy, concerned with its natural objective of economic
efficiency, the scope for non-economic evidence in antitrust
proceedings must be limited. Antitrust decisions should be based
primarily on general presumptions or case-specific arguments
about competition and efficiency; other considerations should
come into play only as tiebreakers.
The debate in the U.S. on optimal antitrust rules to cover
"predatory pricing" and related reactions to entry by dominant
firms can serve to illustrate the application of these three
principles. This debate was triggered by Areeda and Turner
[1975].12 They noted that prices below short-run marginal cost
could not be profit-maximizing, were too low from the point of
(very) short-run economic efficiency, and could serve to elimi-
nate new sources of competition. They contended that short-run
average variable cost was the best available proxy for short-run
marginal cost. (I think it would have been better to argue that.
short-run average variable cost is likely to be the best avail-
able proxy for the estimate of short-run marginal cost used by
decisionmakers.) These arguments led them to propose that a
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dominant firm found to have set prices below short-run average
variable cost in response to entry should be found in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. I find the efficiency argument
underlying this proposal plausible, and thus consistent with
the second principle above, though as Scherer [1976]3 and others
have pointed out, the Areeda-Turner analysis is hardly complete
or rigorous.
Scherer [1976] advocated replacing the simple, bright-line
Areeda-Turner test by a full-blown, efficiency-oriented, unstruc-
tured, rule-of-reason analysis of cases involving allegations of
predation. If I thought that such analyses were likely to be
worth more on average than would they cost, I would agree. The
Areeda-Turner rule is surely likely to produce inefficient
outcomes in a non-trivial fraction of all predation cases. But
Scherer's own description of the factors that would have to be
considered in a complete rule-of-reason analysis convinces me
that the incremental costs are likely to dwarf the incremental
benefits, especially when account is taken of the greater risk
that such a process would impose on dominant firms and on both
actual and potential entrants. (See also the response by
Areeda and Turner [1976].) If one attaches any substantial
value to simplicity and predictability, one must apply the
third principle above and reject Scherer's proposal.
Baumol [1979] and Williamson [1977] have proposed alterna-
tive tests for predation that do not involve comparing post-entry
prices with costs. Their tests involve restricting the changes





entry or exit of rivals. The welfare argument underlying both
proposals is that limiting a firm's reaction to entry forces it
to lower its pre-entry prices if it wishes to discourage entry,
and, since entry is relatively rare in most industries, pre-entry
prices are more important than post-entry prices. This too is
plausible. But I think adoption of either proposal would lead
to much more complex and uncertain litigation than would variants
of the Areeda-Turner rule. (See the case-specific discussion in
Schmalensee [1979].) I would thus trade a simpler test for
weaker efficiency arguments in this instance, though clearly this
is a personal and debatable choice.
Sticking with variants of the Areeda-Turner approach, Posner
[1976] argues plausibly that there is no efficiency case for
ruling any prices above average total cost illegal. This is not
a fully rigorous argument, of course: conditions (2) and (3)
above make it clear that if a dominant firm has operating advan-
tages, a price above average total cost can be below the cost of
an entrant whose successful entry would be socially beneficial.
(See also Roberts [1985] and the literature he cites on the
proposition that successful and socially undesirable predation
need not involve sales below cost.) But, as there is no real
hope of incorporating conditions like (2) or (3) in a general
rule, Posner's proposal seems sensible.
Joskow and Klevorick [1979] have argued for a two-tier
approach, in which the courts would throw out cases in which the
structural conditions were not condusive to rational and effec-
tive predation before applying any cost test. This is perfectly
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consistent with the first of the principles discussed
above: rules aimed at dominant firms in principle should only
be applied to dominant firms in practice. It also applies the
second principle by limiting the application of rules against
predation to situations in which predation might serve to
inhibit the erosion of dominant positions.
The argument so far suggests the beginnings of a structured
rule-of-reason approach to predation cases. First, apply the
first-tier Joskow-Klevorick test, and dismiss any cases not
involving dominant firms operating in markets in which predation
could be anti-competitive. Second, dismiss cases involving
prices above the dominant firm's average total cost. Third,
rule prices below short-run average variable cost illegal. This
leaves a sizeable grey area, involving prices between average
total cost and short-run variable cost. In light of all that has
been written on this topic, it seems unlikely that economists
will soon agree on the best treatment of such prices.
It follows that simplicity and, possibly, other considera-
tions should be invoked to devise rules governing dominant
firms that price between short-run average variable cost and
average total cost in response to an entrant. Ordover and
Willig [1981], for instance, define predation as actions that
7-
would not be profitable unless they had the effect of eliminating
a rival. They call this "an economic definition," but it
plainly reflects the dictionary definition of "predation" and
basic notions of fairness rather a rigorous analysis of economic
efficiency. (See, for instance, demonstrations by Saloner
_5
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[1985] and Schwartz [1984] that application of this definition
may reduce efficiency.) But this is not really a serious
criticism to my mind. If one feels that the rules that Ordover
and Willig derive from their definition (and the derivation is
"economic" even if the definition is not) were simple and did
not conflict with anything in the preceding paragraph, society
would likely lose little by adopting them. (I am not personally
persuaded that their rules pass these tests, however.)
YI. CNCLUSIQN AND IMPLICATIONS-
Economists have produced a great deal of interesting theory
about the nature, origins, and persistence of market dominance.
Our factual knowledge is much less systematic and impressive. We
know that strategic advantages, unrelated to operating efficien-
cies, can retard the erosion of market dominance, but it is not
clear how important this mechanism is in practice. We know that
dominant positions may derive from rent-seeking and from innova-
tion, but we do not know much about the typical mix. Moreover,
the more carefully we study economic efficiency questions in
markets that have dominant firms (or are imperfectly competitive
for other reasons), the more complex are the second-best problems
we encounter.
All of this should make us humble about our ability to
prescribe efficiency-enhancing general antitrust rules or case-
specific remedies. But I do not think that it should reduce
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such an outcome. While our ability to deal with questions of
economic efficiency and competitive effectiveness is limited,
nobody else can do better. If the only effect of economists'
contributions to antitrust policy debates were to promote
efficiency and competition as goals, we would make a substantial
contribution. An active antitrust policy without clear objec-
tives can be a major source of social risk and wasted resources.
And, as I have argued in this essay, economists can contribute
more than this without sacrificing objectivity or shedding the
humility to which we are so richly entitled.
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FOOTNOTES
*I am indebted to Ian Ayres, Paul Geroski, Paul Joskow,
Garth Saloner, the Editors, and the other Conference.
participants for useful comments on an earlier version of
this essay. The usual waiver of liability applies, of
course.
1. U.S. v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
2. Fox (1984) provides a nice discussion of the cases decided
by the EC Court of Justice under Article 86 of the Treaty
of Rome and a comparison with US antitrust law.
3. Remarks of Robert B. Shaprio, in "Antitrust in
Transition: Two Dialogues," The Conference Board, Research
Bulletin 184, New York, 1985, p. 21. In the original,
oral version of these remarks, the phrase was "winner-bashing."
4. These points and the arguments of the next paragraph are
developed in Landes and Posner [1981] and Schmalensee
[1979, 1982].
5. U.S. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Company, 351 U.S. 377
(1956).
6. See also Roberts [1985] for an excellent overview of
recent theoretical work. I must quarrel with Geroski and
Jacquemin's [1984, pp. 3-5] decision to define dominance
by the presence of strategic advantages. This departs
from conventional usage in a potentially confusing
direction, since even incumbent firms with very little




entrants; see, for instance, Bernheim [1984], Lane [1980],
and Prescott and Visscher [1977].
7. On the conditions necessary for rational preemption of
technological opportunities, see, for instance, Dasgupta
[1985], Fudenberg, et al [1983], Harris and Vickers [1985],
Lewis [1983], and Reinganum [1983]. In an interesting
variation on this theme, Gallini [1984] has shown that it
may pay an incumbent dominant firm with patent protection
to license that patent to a potential entrant (i.e., to
premit entry) in order to prevent unprofitable competition
to develop a better technology or product. Judd [1983]
has recently pointed out some difficulties in making
credible preemptive investments in new products.
8. J. Moody, 1904, The Truth about the Trusts (Moody, New
York), p. 487; cited in Stiger [1950]. For overviews of
these "mergers for monopoly", as Stigler calls them, and
the associated early literature, see also Caves, et al
[1984] and Chandler [1977].
9. Suppose share decays exponentially, with share t years
after formation given by S(t) = S(0)exp(-kt). Setting
S(0) = .66 and S(24) = .42, one obtains k = .0188, which
implies S(36.9) = S(0)/2.
10. The U.S. Steel merger seems an exception to this
generalization. It occurred in the right sort of industry
and was clearly successful (Stigler [1965]). In Chandler's
[1977, p. 342] tabular analysis of mergers, he describes
the firm as "integrated," but he notes later [p. 361] that
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until the 1930's, U.S. Steel "continued to be a holding
company that administered its many subsidiaries through a
very small general office," which "did little to coordinate,
plan, and evaluate for [sic] the activities of the
subsidiaries." The firm thus "remained little more than a
legal consolidation." Since production was not rationalized
and control was not centralized, it is hard to imagine
that U.S. Steel had operating advantages over its rivals
or was capable of exploiting any strategic advantages it
may have possessed.
11. Easterbrook [1984] and Leffler [1985] discuss the difficulty
of proving, especially to judges and juries, that particular
rules or remedies are likely to enhance efficiency. They
basically conclude that vigorous competition should replace
economic efficiency as the standard for evaluating antitrust
proposals. I am broadly sympathetic to this general
position and to much of their discussions of its
implications. But I think Leffler errs badly when he
essentially equates [p. 385] injury to competition with
injury to competitors. Investments that lower the costs
of a dominant firm generally injure its competitiors,
but it makes no sense to outlaw cost reduction for this
reason.
12. The relevant literature includes contributions by Areeda
and Turner [175, 1976], Baumol [1979], Joskow and Klevorick
[1979], Ordover and Willig [1981], Posner [1976], Scherer
[1976], Schmalensee [1979], Schwartz [1984], Williamson
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[1977], and others. For a nice overview of this literature
and a discussion of some key cases, see the opinion of
Judge Stephen Breyer, Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp, et al, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
29 December 1983 (reprinted in Commerce Clearing House,
Trade Cases, 1984-1, pp. 67252- 67263.).
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